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45.01  An important distinction between Gwynedd and Clwyd is that the evidence before us in relation to Gwynedd local authority community homes has not revealed the presence of any persistent sexual abuser on the scale of Howarth or Norris during the period of 24 years under review. We heard allegations of sexual abuse against nine identified members of staff but most of these were named by one complainant only and the complainant in respect of each of them was different. As for the others, one member of staff only was named by as many as six complainants but the allegations against him did not disclose any discernible pattern of sexual misconduct to lend them credibility and we are left in doubt about them.

45.02  A similar distinction has emerged in relation to the private residential establishments because it has not been suggested that any persistent sexual abuser was involved in the running of any of the private schools or homes that we have discussed. There were a few cases that we have outlined in Chapter 39[575] but Gwynedd Social Services Department was only involved in one of these and acted promptly and appropriately, as we have described in paragraph 39.48.

  45.03  There were two cases in the period under review of proved sexual abuse in foster homes within Gwynedd[576]. In both these cases the offenders were prosecuted promptly after complaints had been made and we have discussed the relevant boarding out issues in relation to them in Chapter 42.

  45.04  In these circumstances it is unnecessary to devote a separate chapter to consideration of the failure of Gwynedd Social Services Department to detect sexual abuse earlier or to prevent it from occurring. In general, the lessons that we have drawn in Chapter 29 in respect of Clwyd's experience of sexual abuse are equally relevant to local authorities within the former Gwynedd for the future but we do not suggest that there were particular failures by the former Gwynedd Social Services Department in relation to sexual abuse in the period under review as distinct from other forms of abuse. In particular, there is no evidence that their recruitment procedures failed to elicit relevant information about earlier sexual misconduct from any potential residential child care worker or potential foster parent.

  45.05  In this chapter, therefore, we deal generally with Gwynedd's failure to eliminate abuse. Not surprisingly, the underlying reasons for this were broadly similar to those that we have found in Clwyd and they will be stated more shortly to avoid unnecessary repetition. But the pattern of abuse and the relevant line management in Gwynedd were different. About two-thirds of the known complainants were former residents of Ty'r Felin during the period when Nefyn Dodd was Officer-in-Charge; and from 1981/1982 until November 1989, when he became unable to continue working, he was the line manager for all the community homes in Gwynedd. Much of the discussion in this chapter hinges, therefore, upon Nefyn Dodd's dominant role and his authoritarian personality.

The appointment and advancement of Nefyn Dodd

  45.06  If Nefyn Dodd had not been appointed as Officer-in-Charge of Ty'r Felin with effect from January 1978, it is unlikely that there would have been any police investigation of Gwynedd homes in 1986/1987 or in 1991/1993 and Gwynedd would not have been included in the scope of this Tribunal's inquiry. There can be no doubt that his conduct at Ty'r Felin and the regime that he imposed there were the mainsprings of the complaints from children in care and that his methods affected the quality of residential care for children throughout Gwynedd.

  45.07  With the benefit of hindsight it can be said confidently that Dodd's appointment to Ty'r Felin was a grave mistake. It is less easy to say so without that benefit but, in our judgment, it is very questionable whether he was a suitable person to appoint as head of an Observation and Assessment Centre, bearing in mind his limited credentials and even lesser experience. As it was, he had no trained staff to assist him in the relevant work and Ty'r Felin never functioned properly for the purposes for which it was designed.

  45.08  We accept, however, that those responsible for Dodd's appointment could not have been expected to foresee at that time how his personality and practices would develop. The strongest criticism is that he was permitted to develop them, without any restraining influence, and then encouraged to extend his methods and authority, effectively without any close supervision and monitoring. The initial responsibility for these errors must rest upon the Deputy Director at the time, Parry, who had ample opportunity, as a frequent visitor to Ty'r Felin, to observe Dodd but seems to have been oblivious to his manifest failings, evidenced (for example) by his directions to members of staff in the log book[577].

  45.09  In the event the advancement of Dodd to line management responsibility for the community homes was justly criticised by the Dyfed team in 1981 both on structural grounds and on the basis of Dodd's methods; but their views were ignored. Bowen Rees and Ebsworth were primarily concerned to protect T E Jones from what they regarded as unfair criticism and to use the inquiry to resolve the position in relation to Parry. Neither Lucille Hughes nor Gethin Evans was shown the report and the result was that Evans, who was a comparative newcomer, accepted Dodd's invitations to strengthen the latter's position by issuing memoranda to the Heads of Homes, emphasising that all communications by them to headquarters must be via Dodd[578].

  45.10  The inappropriate delegation of important headquarters responsibilities to a Head of Home reflected a wider penny-pinching attitude to child care matters in Gwynedd and Dodd's position became even more anomalous when he was advanced to Principal Officer (Residential Establishments--Children) whilst retaining his appointment as Officer-in-Charge of Ty'r Felin. The pattern of delegation without effective accountability in return was a feature of the Social Services Department throughout the period under review with the result that the interests of children in care were neglected at the highest level.

  45.11  In practical terms the effect of these arrangements was that there was no meaningful channel of complaint, even for members of the residential care staff. At Ty'r Felin Nefyn Dodd was sole arbiter, reporting to himself; and for most of the period he had an ever present ally in his wife, June Dodd, who would carry to him swiftly news of any potentially embarrassing criticism, misbehaviour or rebellion. Alison Taylor's experiences, as we have recounted them in Chapters 33 and 34, illustrate very clearly the fate that was likely to befall any "whistleblower" who tried to by-pass Nefyn Dodd in order to gain the attention of higher authority; and it is noteworthy that her colleagues, working in the same oppressive regime, were willing to sign critical statements about her when she was disciplined for her actions. How much more oppressive must it have seemed to a child resident contemplating making a complaint and how unreal was the prospect of him/her doing so if the alleged abuser was (for example) Nefyn Dodd himself or John Roberts?

  45.12  The denial of access to headquarters was not confined to residential care staff but extended to Area Officers and thence to field workers in respect of children in Gwynedd community homes. This was spelt out expressly in a memorandum dated 15 October 1984, which was drafted by Gethin Evans but signed by Lucille Hughes and addressed to all the Area Officers and Dodd. The purpose of the memorandum was stated to be "to clarify that area staff need not contact (headquarters) relating to problems concerning children in our own community homes". Moreover, it contained passages such as:

"I would remind area staff that officers-in-charge are not expected to contact this office unless there is an absolute emergency when Mr Dodd cannot be found or contacted."

"Area Officer and Co-ordinator/Supervisor should discuss together any acute problems which their staff cannot settle. Reference back to head office should not be necessary."

"Head office staff should only become involved with youngsters in our homes when he or she is subject to transfer from a non-county establishment into our own homes, and where some element of interest needs to be retained."

  45.13  This concentration of influence and authority in the hands of the Officer-in-Charge of one of the community homes and a person who did not even rank as a Principal Officer at the time must be very strongly criticised; and it is remarkable that the only reference in the memorandum to monitoring by headquarters was the statement that head office would "continue to monitor all out of county placements in liaison with area". The blame for these misconceived arrangements rests squarely upon Lucille Hughes and, under her, upon Gethin Evans and they are not excused by lack of knowledge of the Dyfed team strictures. The arrangements as such, detached from the personality of Nefyn Dodd, were bad structurally; and both Lucille Hughes and Gethin Evans had had ample opportunity by 1983/1984 to acquaint themselves with many of Nefyn Dodd's weaknesses and limitations. Unhappily, however, they provide strong evidence of Lucille Hughes' failure to involve herself actively in the management of children's services, despite her pre-1971 experience, and of Gethin Evans' disinclination to involve himself in the practical aspects of his responsibilities for the community homes.

The absence of complaints procedures

  45.14  In the face of the arrangements that we have outlined in the preceding section, it is difficult to see how any conventional complaints procedure could have been effective but the reality was that no such procedure was available, even to staff, until the latest stages of the period under review. Furthermore, such documents as there were dealing with residential care practice were largely out of date until the late 1980s (at the earliest) and do not appear to have been readily available to residential care staff.

  45.15  It would be wrong to give the impression that Gethin Evans was not a hard working man. On the contrary, the evidence before us is that he was very committed to his work; he arrived at his office very early and worked long hours, despite his additional responsibilities as a district councillor, but he was essentially an office man. Amongst his functions were the production and up-dating of departmental manuals but he said in evidence that there was no written complaints procedure until (he believed) 1990. Before that there were only "guidelines to do with complaints" that he had written "to the department around 1979/1980". When asked what he had expected to happen to a serious complaint by a resident, he replied that, between 1982 and 1987, he would have expected it to have reached him through Dodd.

  45.16  We have referred earlier[579] to the pamphlet called "Handbook for Children in Residential Care", which was drafted by Nefyn Dodd and approved by Gethin Evans in 1988 and which contained a section on complaints. It is fair to say that it contained the outlines of a complaints procedure but it was already obsolescent when it was distributed to heads of homes on or about 28 October 1988, in view of the impending Children Act. It is very doubtful on the evidence before us that it was distributed to resident children generally and we have not been shown any up-dated version. Although it did envisage that a child might ring the Director of Social Services if dissatisfied, there was no change in the departmental procedure whereby all complaints by or through staff were to be channelled via Dodd; and only a very resolute child would have been likely to accept the invitation to complain to headquarters.

The incidence of, and response to, complaints

  45.17  If any additional discouragement was needed for potential complainants, it was provided by the actual response of higher management to the few contemporary complaints that were pursued. We have illustrated this earlier in Chapters 33 and 34 in relation to complaints that arose at Ty'r Felin and Ty Newydd. Thus, the alleged assault on a boy by John Roberts on 24 May 1984 was reported by Alison Taylor to Lucille Hughes and Gethin Evans but no remedial action was taken; and June Dodd's reaction was to complain, "How could you let us down?"[580]. Again, a member of staff who wrote a report in 1984 in another boy's file when the latter complained that a visible lump on his head had been caused by John Roberts was told next day that the entry had been deleted[581]. Moreover, when Alison Taylor reported a complaint against June Dodd in February 1986 to the effect that she had thumped a boy on the shoulder in the office at Ty Newydd, Taylor was told by Gethin Evans, who investigated the matter, that she was creating trouble unnecessarily[582]. Yet again, Taylor's report to Dodd on 30 July 1985 about an incident in which X was alleged to have slapped a girl resident at Ty Newydd resulted in no action being taken by Gethin Evans on the ground that Evans believed X to have been under stress at the time[583].

  45.18  These may be regarded as comparatively minor instances of alleged physical abuse (in the overall possible scale of such abuse) but the responses to them were symptomatic of a pervasive intention amongst senior officials from Nefyn Dodd upwards to suppress complaints when they were made, however serious they might be. A striking example of this was the response to the complaint by A of sexual abuse at Queens Park, which we have dealt with in detail in paragraphs 36.14 to 36.29. The evidence in relation to that incident indicates clearly that Lucille Hughes, Gethin Evans and Nefyn Dodd were all anxious to dispose of the matter quickly in the interest of the member of staff against whom the allegation had been made. No proper investigation took place and A's Area Officer was led to protest about the way in which the matter had been handled. It is clear also that Larry King, who had understood the need for a proper investigation, was left out of the matter after he had interviewed the alleged abuser, despite his responsibilities for Child Protection.

  45.19  Another notable example of suppression was the response by headquarters to the allegations of physical abuse by the foster parent, Norman Roberts, in the case of M. We have traced the history of this in Chapter 41, in particular at paragraphs 41.31 to 41.45. It is abundantly clear from this evidence that a full investigation involving the police should have been set in train, having regard to the nature of the injuries and the available medical evidence; and the highly objectionable reason given for not doing so was "to prevent endangering the placement of all the children"[584]. In the event the prosecution of Norman Roberts was delayed for over seven years because the police were not informed at the time and, in our judgment, Lucille Hughes, Glanville Owen, Gethin Evans and Larry King all bear a share of the responsibility for the failure to respond to the events appropriately. We underline also that Gethin Evans' report to the Children's Sub-Committee on 13 March 1986 was a gravely defective account of the relevant history[585].

  45.20  In this climate any "whistleblower" was likely to receive short shrift and so events proved. Wholly independently of Alison Taylor, a former member of the staff at Ty'r Felin wrote to Glanville Owen in January 1985 listing a series of criticisms of Nefyn Dodd's management of that community home[586]. The response of Glanville Owen to this letter is related in paragraph 33.122 of this report. He saw the author of the letter to explain to him the seriousness of his complaints, asking him whether he wished to "stand by" them. Some were withdrawn, but not the allegations of physical abuse. According to Owen's evidence to the Tribunal, he then looked at the allegations as a whole rather than individually, whatever that may mean, after Nefyn Dodd had denied them and a dismissive letter was sent to the complainant in the name of the Director of Social Services. Owen's comment on the matter in his oral evidence was that, looking at the matter 12 years on, he was quite appalled by the allegations and the way that they were not investigated by him. It must be added that dismissal of the complaints was no doubt facilitated by Dodd's counter criticisms of the complainant's conduct and motivation. Dodd had refused to give the complainant a reference when the latter left Ty'r Felin and it appears to have been alleged that he, a married man with two children, had had an affair with a student at Ty'r Felin whereas the complainant's evidence was that the affair occurred after he left.

  45.21  The responses to Alison Taylor's complaints were similar in quality and were classic illustrations of what is likely to happen to a "whistleblower". She was dubbed a "trouble maker" at an early stage and later the Chief Executive (Bowen Rees) was told that she was worse than that. It was particularly unfortunate also that the unsatisfactory Chairman of the Social Services Committee, criticised as such by Bowen Rees[587], should have been the person selected (or perhaps self-selected) to discuss with Alison Taylor her complaints and concerns in October 1986[588]. Again, we have no doubt that the police officer in charge of the 1986/1987 police investigation, Detective Chief Superintendent Gwynne Owen, was given a similar view of Taylor by senior officers of the Social Services Department at the outset of his investigation. Thus, a wall of disbelief was constructed before any of the individual allegations reported by Taylor was investigated and the ultimate decision not to prosecute anyone was accepted with inappropriate enthusiasm and without further scrutiny by the Social Services Department of the underlying evidence.

  45.22  Any suggestion that Alison Taylor was a lone disaffected employee in her complaints about Nefyn Dodd is rebutted by the fact that the representative of social workers and child care officers in the Children's Section wrote a letter to Lucille Hughes on 24 January 1986, which was headed "Plea for Help--Open Letter". The following extracts from the letter, which was circulated to county councillors, speak for themselves:

"It is with much regret that we have to bring to your notice of some of the problems that are the reason for the resignations, poor morale and the high level of sickness in this section.

The staff are dissatisfied, misused and abused. The working conditions bear no resemblance to our conditions of service. We are discriminated against by having to work long hours up to 15 hours each Saturday and Sunday for which we receive no enhanced payments as do other sections. We have to work in an atmosphere of fear and put up with the obscene language of a very senior officer of this department. It is difficult at case conference to deal with this officer, very often to the detriment of the child in question . . .

. . . Nothing will ever be right until an enquiry is conducted into this section. We are all being hoodwinked, manoeuvred, and degraded, we ask for your help in putting these matters right before it is too late."

  45.23  Lucille Hughes said in evidence that she had difficulty in recollecting this letter but went on to refer to raising the question of bad language with Dodd subsequently at one of her regular meetings with him. She "would imagine" that the letter was looked at in committee, if it was circulated to county councillors, and she would have raised rota matters with the Assistant Director and staff officers.

Conclusions

  45.24  To sum up, the organisation and management of the community homes in Gwynedd were such that a degree of child abuse was almost bound to occur and the only cause for relief is that it did not occur on a greater scale than has been disclosed by the evidence. Residential care staff were largely untrained and opportunities for in service training were very limited. There were no clear guidelines for staff and children with widely ranging needs were placed together in community homes without reference to any overall care strategy or individual care planning. Access to field workers was limited and, for most of the period, control of the community homes was vested in a single individual, without any adequate provision for monitoring and supervision by higher management. There was no recognised complaints procedure and direct contact with headquarters was actively discouraged. Moreover, the few contemporary complaints that did penetrate the system (including those in the fostering case of M) were treated dismissively by headquarters officers, who failed to investigate them fully and impartially.

  45.25  For these failings the two main Directors of Social Services successively must bear major responsibility, together with the headquarters staff responsible for child care matters, to the extent that we have indicated, and Nefyn Dodd in his dual roles. Members of Gwynedd County Council and, in particular, the Social Services Children's Sub-Committee must also, however, bear a share of the responsibility for their failure to acquaint themselves adequately with conditions in the community homes and to monitor and control the operation of the Children's Section of the Social Services Department; and we will enlarge upon this comment in the next chapter.

Footnotes:

575   See paras 39.43 to 39.48.

576   See paras 42.03 to 42.17 and 42.25 to 42.29.

577   See para 33.43.

578   See paras 33.23 to 33.25.

579   See paras 33.116 and 33.117.

580   See para 33.103.

581   See para 33.120.

582   See paras 33.90, 33.91 and 34.17(8).

583   See paras 34.10 and 34.17(7).

584   See para 41.43.

585   See para 41.51.

586   See para 33.121.

587   See para 44.57.

588   See para 34.23.