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Appendix 4: Note by the Chairman of the Tribunal on its procedures

Preparations for the hearings

  1      Leading Counsel to the Tribunal, Gerard Elias QC, made his opening speech on 21 and 22 January 1997, seven months after the setting up of the Tribunal had first been announced by the Secretary of State for Wales and just under five months after the members of the Tribunal had been formally appointed. This was the very minimum period required for preparation, having regard to the large number of potential witnesses to be seen, the enormous number of documents to be inspected and the widespread dispersal of both documents and sources of information that had occurred on local government reorganisation with effect from 1 April 1996.

  2      All three Counsel to the Tribunal were fully engaged in the preparations from early in September 1996 onwards. By that time the Treasury Solicitor had appointed a small team of lawyers, led by Brian McHenry (who had wide experience of public inquiries) as Solicitor to the Tribunal, to instruct Counsel and supervise a large group of up to 30 (from time to time) paralegals and two trainee solicitors in the preliminary work. This involved at first the examination of some 9,500 unsorted children's files, numerous staff files and 3,500 statements made to the police as well as the records of both former County Councils and of about 85 children's homes. In the end 12,000 documents were scanned into the Tribunal's database, including documents extracted from the large number of files submitted by the Welsh Office.

  3      A Chief Administrative Officer to the Tribunal, Evan Hughes, was seconded from the staff of the Welsh Office and he had a team of eight working under him to provide administrative and financial support. He was responsible, under the Welsh Office budget holder, for authorising expenditure and dealt with all the ancillary services as well as the processing of bills. There was a memorandum of understanding with the Welsh Office.

  4      We were fortunate to secure about half of the former but new headquarters of the Alyn and Deeside District Council at Ewloe in Flintshire, near major road junctions, as the venue for our hearings and as the office for the Tribunal and the main part of its staff. It was necessary, however, to obtain separate accommodation at the Shire Hall, Mold, for the purpose of housing many of the documents and carrying out the initial trawl through them. The former Council Chamber at Ewloe was specially adapted for the hearings with convenient working space for Counsel and solicitors and seating accommodation for the public.

  5      Preliminary matters that had to be negotiated under the leadership of the Welsh Office and with the guidance of its legal adviser, David Lambert, included the appointment of a witness interviewing team (WIT) comprised of former detective officers of the South Wales Police and adjacent forces, the engagement of a witness support service (The Bridge Child Care Development Service[929]), including a detailed specification of the service to be provided, and the provision of a Live Note transcript service by Sellars Imago, including document imaging. A Press Officer, David Norbury, was appointed in January 1997.

  6      Inspection of the statements to the police disclosed that about 650 former children in care had made complaints of abuse of varying gravity. The Tribunal itself advertised its proceedings widely with a request that complainants should make themselves known and about 100 persons responded to this request. In addition, the Tribunal's legal team selected at random as potential witnesses 600 former residents of children's homes in North Wales (about ten per cent) who were not known to have made any complaint. The members of the WIT were eventually able to interview 400 widely dispersed witnesses and travelled over 80,000 miles.

  7      The Tribunal decided that, as a general rule, we would receive evidence of abuse only from complainants who could be traced and who were willing to make a statement to the Tribunal. This involved, for most of them, making a statement to a member of the Tribunal's WIT, who was provided with a proforma containing guidance as to how the interview should be conducted; and complainants were informed that they could have their solicitor present at the interview, if they wished, and of the availability of the support service, if they required it.

  8      Two major problems intensified the work of the Tribunal's legal team throughout the preparation for the hearings and the subsequent proceedings. The first of these was the need to draft "Salmon letters" to all those who were alleged to have been guilty of abuse and to those who were likely to be the subject of other criticism, giving adequate particulars of what was said against them. In the case of alleged abusers, the problem was mainly one of timing because the evidence of the complainants had to be obtained before the letters could be drafted. Most of the alleged abusers had been interviewed by the police so that they had at least a general recollection of what might be alleged but the Salmon letters had to be based on the available up to date evidence, which, in some cases, included new allegations. To our great regret many Salmon letters had to be posted for this reason during the pre-Christmas period because of the urgent need to begin the hearings.

  9      The Salmon letters addressed to administrators and some others presented the different problem of diffuseness. They had to be drafted before the Tribunal's legal team had received any clear evidence of divisions of responsibility within the two former social services departments and the Welsh Office; and, even if the legal team had received some preliminary evidence about this, it would still have been necessary for the Salmon letters to have been drafted in wide terms, covering a broad range of issues. The result was that some Salmon letter recipients had to undertake considerable work, referring to forgotten files, in order to deal with the matters raised in the letters. Moreover, it was inevitable that informal interrogatories had to be addressed to some of the recipients, after their statements had been received in order to remedy omissions or clarify matters that remained unclear.

  10    I confess that I have not been able to devise a practical solution to the problem of over-diffuse Salmon letters. If matters of potential criticism are omitted, the Tribunal is open to the criticism of unfairness unless it grants an appropriate adjournment; and successive adjournments would cause major difficulties for everyone involved. A form of preliminary hearing or investigation could take place before each Salmon letter in this category was sent out, but that would also lengthen the hearings considerably in any complex case; and the procedure would not necessarily lead to a more concise statement of issues unless the relevant lines and areas of responsibility were clear cut. It may be that our own procedure was the only practicable one open to us, having regard to the fact that we had to investigate nearly a quarter of a century of administrative and other activity.

  11    The other main problem was that of disclosure of documents to the interested parties. Public interest immunity from disclosure was claimed by the successor authorities as a matter of principle in respect of a large proportion of the two former social services departments' documents, particularly the children's files and staff personal records. In the event, we adopted a procedure whereby the initial selection of relevant documents for each witness was made on a broad basis by the paralegal team under supervision; a narrower selection was then made on the basis of relevance by the Tribunal's legal team; and the final choice was made by me after weighing the public interest issue. The result was that all relevant documents, as far as the Tribunal was aware of them, were disclosed. In the case of police documents (other than statements to the police) they were divided, by agreement between the Tribunal's Counsel and Counsel for the North Wales Police, into two categories, namely, documents that could be copied by the parties and those that could be inspected but not copied. Inspection of documents and disclosure were made subject to appropriate undertakings limiting the use of information or documents to the purposes of the Tribunal. Parties were at liberty to apply for disclosure of any specific documents that had been withheld.

  12    On the basis of these procedures, core bundles containing all the main relevant documents were formed. These were, however, too large and unwieldy for repeated reference to in the course of a witness' evidence. A relevant smaller bundle was therefore prepared by the Tribunal's legal team for each witness; any other documents required by any of the parties were added to it; and the witness was then able to read and cope with the selected bundle before and in the course of giving evidence.

  13    On the whole, the procedure for disclosure of documents worked quite well with the co-operation of Counsel and solicitors but the volume of documentation to be absorbed in a short time undoubtedly imposed considerable strain on those most closely involved, including some witnesses. There were comparatively few complaints of being taken by surprise and short adjournments were granted whenever asked for on the ground of late disclosure. The Tribunal itself was assisted greatly in assimilating and dealing with the documents and in all other respects by its Clerk, Fiona Walkingshaw, a solicitor who joined us full time in December 1996, after secondment by the Welsh Office to the European Commission in Brussels, and who remained as de facto Secretary to the Tribunal until the presentation of our report.

Preliminary hearings

  14    It was necessary for the Tribunal to hold four preliminary hearings at intervals of five or six weeks beginning on 10 September 1996, mainly to deal with questions of representation. Before our first hearing HM Attorney-General authorised the Tribunal to say that anything any witness said in evidence before the inquiry would not be used in evidence against him or her in any criminal proceedings, except in relation to any offence of perjury or perverting the course of justice.

  15    We decided at the first preliminary hearing to grant anonymity to complainants of physical or sexual abuse and to persons against whom such an allegation was or was likely to be made, in the terms set out in paragraph 1.08 of our report and for the reasons given in the following paragraph of the report. On 11 and 12 February 1997 an application was made by Leading Counsel on behalf of the British Broadcasting Corporation, the Liverpool Daily Post and the Western Mail that we should set aside this "direction". The application was refused and the Tribunal's reasons for rejecting it, as explained by me on 12 February 1997, are annexed to this Appendix together with the revised notice given to the press and media after the application.

  16    We indicated at the first preliminary hearing that any complainant who made a written statement to the Tribunal would be granted representation by Counsel and solicitor, if he/she wished to be represented. We did so on the grounds that it was necessary in the public interest that their views on a range of issues should be put to the Tribunal with professional assistance. It was necessary also that persons against whom they made allegations should be cross-examined on their behalf and that they should have the protection of legal representation when dealing with any counter-allegations that might be made against them.

  17    The obvious problem was that a wide range of solicitors had already been consulted by complainants, some in connection with civil claims and other firms because of their known experience of inquiries into child abuse of a similar kind. Without going into unnecessary details, it became possible by agreement for one silk and two juniors to represent 119 of the complainants and for a separate junior Counsel to represent 18 other complainants. One firm of solicitors acted for 45 of the complainants and another for 18 whilst 61 were represented by 16 firms, forming a Wales and Chester Group led by Gwilym Hughes and Partners for the purpose of joint representation by Counsel[930]. The other 14 complainants were represented by 11 firms of solicitors. In this way nearly all the complainants who gave oral evidence to the Tribunal were legally represented as well as a small number of those who gave written statements but who were not called.

  18    A similar approach to the problem of representation of Salmon letter recipients was adopted as a result of very helpful co-operation by them and by their solicitors. In the event 103 of these recipients were represented by Anna Pauffley QC and Rachel Langdale. The 103 were mainly former residential care workers, including Officers-in-Charge, but some were former senior officers of the Social Services Departments. Representation of other Salmon letter recipients was more diffuse but some former teachers at Bryn Estyn, for example, were jointly represented.

  19    An early objection to these arrangements when they were at the discussion stage was that there were potential conflicts of interest between clients within the same group. A similar problem in more acute form had been faced and overcome, however, in the course of the Aberfan Tribunal's hearings despite wide joint representation, and we considered that the range of experienced Counsel instructed on behalf of the various parties was sufficient to enable any conflict to be accommodated without professional embarrassment. In the event we are not aware that any difficulty arose and we are satisfied that each of the "parties" who required legal representation was fully and fairly represented.

  20    In any prolonged inquiry of this kind the question of legal representation is inextricably linked with the issue of costs, which, in other forms of litigation, would be dealt with separately. In the present inquiry few of the "parties" had sufficient means to meet the cost of their own legal representation. On the other hand the Tribunal itself had no power to make any order for costs: it could only make a recommendation to the Secretary of State for Wales, who had set up the inquiry, that the costs of a particular party should be met out of public funds.

  21    Guidance on this subject was given by HM Attorney-General in answer to a Parliamentary question on 29 January 1990[931] in the following terms:

"Tribunals and Public Inquiries can be set up in a variety of ways. So far as ad hoc tribunals and inquiries are concerned the Government already pays the administrative costs. So far as the costs of legal representation of parties to any inquiry are concerned, where the Government have a discretion they always take careful account of the recommendations on costs of the Tribunal or inquiry concerned. In general, the Government accept the need to pay out of public funds the reasonable costs of any necessary party to the inquiry who would be prejudiced in seeking representation were he in any doubt about funds becoming available. The Government do not accept that the costs of substantial bodies should be met from public funds unless there are special circumstances."

  22    Since the Tribunal's hearings ended the Treasury Solicitor's Department has issued a memorandum[932] containing further guidance on the payment of costs, dealing with such matters as the basis of representation, the control of costs and the process of assessment, including provision for appeals.

  23    A particular problem that arose in this inquiry was that several of the Salmon letter recipients were members or former members of trades unions which had a discretion, usually to be exercised by the union's executive committee, as to whether or not the member or former member should be given support in the form of legal aid in defending himself/herself against allegations in relation to the performance of his/her duties whilst still a member. It is not surprising that, with varying degrees of hesitation, all but two of the relevant trades unions decided against giving legal support in this inquiry and we do not know of any means by which that decision could be challenged successfully. In these circumstances the Tribunal felt bound to recommend that the costs of the past and present members of the unions that had made that decision should be met out of public funds in the light of the Attorney-General's guidance.

  24    The other two trades unions declined to make a decision either way before the Tribunal made its own decision on the costs issue; and Counsel representing the seven Salmon letter recipients affected by this refusal renewed his application that the Tribunal should recommend that his clients' costs be paid out of public funds on the penultimate day of our sittings. Faced with this situation, we agreed to make the recommendation to the Secretary of State for Wales that was sought but to inform him of the background circumstances in which it was made. The Tribunal's dilemma on this issue highlights a real difficulty about the Attorney-General's statement in 1990. Underlying that difficulty is the question whether a "party" whose union agrees to provide legal support is less meritorious than one whose union refuses to do so.

The Tribunal's hearings

  25    As we have said in paragraph 1.11 of the report, we sat on 201 days between 21 January 1997 and 7 April 1998 to hear evidence and submissions. In all 264 witnesses gave oral evidence and we received the written evidence of 311 further witnesses. Evidence was read for a wide variety of reasons, including the deaths of some witnesses, but the range of reasons need not be canvassed here. No important evidence on an abuse issue was read in the face of objections to it. The contents of much of the written evidence that was read were not agreed but it was possible to agree a number of substantial written statements.

  26    Counsel for the various "parties" were invited to make opening statements on their clients' behalf at the conclusion of the opening address by Leading Counsel to the Tribunal.

  27    For convenience, the evidence was divided into successive phases. In Phase 1 we heard the main evidence of alleged abuse (including evidence from alleged abusers), dealing with the various categories of residential establishments in Clwyd and Gwynedd in turn. In Phase 2 we heard the evidence of senior staff and officers from Officer-in-Charge of residential homes upwards to Directors of Social Services. Phase 3 comprised the evidence of the Welsh Office and Phase 4 that of the North Wales Police. In Phase 5 we dealt with Chief Executives and Councillors whilst Phase 6 covered the role of the insurers and Phase 7 the evidence of the six successor authorities.

  28    This division into phases was helpful for a number of reasons. The most important was that it enabled the Tribunal's legal team to formulate an orderly time-table for serving Salmon letters on higher officials and for their responses. Another benefit was that Counsel to the Tribunal were able to present opening statements at the beginning of each phase, clarifying the issues in the light of evidence that had already been given and the Salmon letter responses as well as inter-party discussions in the course of the hearings. Counsel for some of the "parties" chose to make opening statements at the beginning of the phase affecting them.

  29    In view of the distances those involved in the hearings had to travel, the length of the Inquiry, the number of clients to be seen and the documentation, the Tribunal sat for four days each week from 2 pm on Mondays to 1 pm on Fridays, daily from 10.30 am to 1 pm and from 2 pm to 4.30 pm. We sat in sessions of about six weeks with short breaks in between to enable the preparatory work for each session to be completed in the intervals.

  30    Although there are some advocates of wholly inquisitorial proceedings in investigations of this kind, in which the questioning is conducted almost exclusively by the Tribunal itself or Counsel on its behalf, I reached the firm conclusion that such a procedure would be inappropriate in this inquiry. It was essential, in my view, that complainants should be given a full opportunity to put relevant matters based on their own special knowledge to persons against whom they made allegations. Conversely, it was equally important that alleged abusers should have their cases put as they wished to the complainants who made allegations against them. This adversarial factor in the proceedings was inescapable, having regard to the nature of the allegations that the Tribunal had to consider.

  31    In the event Counsel for the many parties exercised proper restraint in questioning the witnesses and there were comparatively few occasions when I had to intervene because of the nature or manner of cross-examination. There were a small number of regrettable incidents and some complainants resented "being put in the dock" as they would describe it but most of them recognised that it was inevitable that their allegations would be challenged by close questioning. It must be said also that Counsel were economical in their cross-examinations with the result that no witness was detained for an excessive time.

  32    In order to save time the written statements to the Tribunal by complainants called to give evidence and any earlier statements to the police that they confirmed were taken as read and formed part of their evidence. Complainants were called by Counsel for the Tribunal and then cross-examined and re-examined in an agreed order. All other witnesses were witnesses of the Tribunal but Salmon letter recipients were led in evidence initially by their own Counsel in order to introduce themselves and to amplify or clarify any matters in their written statements to the Tribunal that they wished to before they were cross-examined.

  33    At the conclusion of the evidence on 12 March 1998, Counsel and solicitors were given time to prepare full written submissions, including any recommendations that their clients wished to make. The Tribunal read these submissions before convening again on 31 March 1998 for a week to hear final oral submissions, limited to 30 minutes for each "party" or group of "parties". Leading Counsel to the Tribunal then made concluding oral submissions supplemented by detailed written submissions.

  34    We held a well attended seminar on 6 and 7 May 1998 to discuss possible recommendations that the Tribunal might make. The expert panel at this seminar comprised Sir William Utting CB, Sir Ronald Hadfield QPM, DL, Adrianne Jones CBE, Brian Briscoe, and Dr Anthony Baker[933]. Questions were addressed to the panel by Counsel to the Tribunal and by other Counsel and solicitors on behalf of the "parties", supplemented by questions from members of the Tribunal.

NORTH WALES CHILD ABUSE TRIBUNAL OF INQUIRY

Anonymity

12 February 1997

Giving the Tribunal's reasons, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Sir Ronald Waterhouse, said

"I must say, first of all, that this is not a ruling in any meaningful legal sense. It is an explanation of action taken by the Tribunal, given as a matter of courtesy in response to submissions made on behalf of the BBC and some newspapers. In giving the explanation I should say that, in so far as I touch on matters of law, they represent my view, but so far as questions of general assessment are concerned, they are the view of the Tribunal collectively.

  I accept that this Tribunal has no power to make an order affecting the press, apart from statute, and I make clear that no order has been made by the Tribunal under either section 4 or section 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. The word 'direction' that appears in the material guidance is, at least partly, a misnomer. The word was used only in the sense of a practice direction explaining procedure and was intended to be an indication to the parties involved in the Inquiry as to how the Tribunal was intending to proceed, coupled with an intimation to the press as to the view that the Tribunal would take, and in particular, the action I would take as Chairman, if the identity of any person in the 'anonymous' categories referred to in the document was to be disclosed in a publication.

   The background to the action we have taken is that the Tribunal has received requests from virtually all the potential witnesses who are complainants of abuse and from the persons against whom allegations of abuse are made that they should be granted anonymity in the proceedings. We have been given information about the impact of the Inquiry and the gathering of evidence upon potential witnesses and we have reached the firm conclusion that there is substantial risk that the course of justice and the proceedings of the Tribunal would be seriously impeded and prejudiced if there were to be general publication of the identity of the abusers and persons against whom allegations of abuse are made. For that reason we regard it as necessary that anonymity should be conferred as far as possible upon the witnesses referred to in order to avoid the risk of serious prejudice of the kind that was discussed in the House of Lords in the case of Attorney-General versus Leveller Magazine reported in 1979, as well as that specified in the Contempt of Court Act 1981.

   In considering what we should do, we have had a large number of considerations in mind. These include the terms of reference which we have to follow, the background to the setting up of the Inquiry and the need for full disclosure by witnesses to avoid any continuing suggestion of cover-up. By 'full disclosure' I mean the interviewing of every available potential witness and the objective that those witnesses shall give as full and true an account as they can of the facts within their knowledge both in their written statements and in their oral testimony if and when they are called to give evidence.

   We have had in mind also that, in the context of the first paragraph of our terms of reference, the identities of particular complainants or persons against whom allegations are made is of much less importance than the question whether the alleged abuse occurred and the circumstances in which it is alleged to have happened. We have obviously had regard also to the provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 to the extent that they are relevant.

   These are all matters that we have had in mind in making our assessment that the course of justice in these proceedings is likely to be seriously impeded if anonymity is not conferred upon the potential witnesses in the first part of our inquiry.

   The difficulty that we had to face, however, is that, despite the need for anonymity, there is no practical means of conducting the actual hearing within the Tribunal Chamber by adopting a series of symbols for witnesses; neither a numerical nor an alphabetical system would be readily comprehensible, bearing in mind the large number of persons involved.

   The problem is not confined to intelligent Counsel and solicitors steeped in the case, but extends, of course, to witnesses and the transcribers of the evidence. The prospect of a witness, probably ill-educated because of circumstances beyond his control, being faced with the problem of not naming persons to whom he wishes to refer, but identifying them by a code set in front of him in the witness box, is too appalling to contemplate. The length of the proceedings and the extra public expense involved in that procedure would be intolerable, and the ultimate report of the Tribunal might be delayed by many months.

   An alternative possible procedure would be for the Tribunal to sit 'in camera' but that would defeat one of the major objects of the setting up of the Tribunal, namely, to assuage public anxiety about what has occurred in the past. It could lead to unjustified suggestions of a cover-up and we have rejected it, bearing in mind what was said by the Salmon Commission about the need for hearings to be in public.

   Taking fully into account that guidance, we have decided that it is necessary for the hearings to take place in public and for names to be given in the course of the hearings. In the event the prejudice to the witnesses is likely to be, and has proved to be, minimal because attendance at the Inquiry by the general public has been very limited. The proceedings have been entirely open, but attendance has been largely confined to persons who have a direct interest in the subject matter of the Inquiry, most of whom are legally represented or who are at least potentially witnesses.

   Thus, the result of names being given in the hearings involves only a minor breach of the anonymity which we wish to confer upon the witnesses to whom we have referred. Most of the people who hear names in the course of the hearing would be entitled to know the names because of their position in relation to the Inquiry and would not therefore be covered by the anonymity rule.

   Having considered all the difficulties, and not least the exchanges that occurred in Parliament when the announcement was made that the Inquiry would take place, we decided to proceed as we have done but to indicate to the press in clear terms that in our view the publication of material enabling the public to identify witnesses who are either complainants of abuse or persons against whom allegations of abuse are made would seriously impede and prejudice the course of the hearings of this Inquiry. It would do so because it would tend very strongly to dissuade witnesses of either category from coming forward and telling the full truth, and such a disincentive would affect also such independent witnesses who were either residents at the relevant care homes or present there as employees or in some official other capacity from giving honest evidence.

   In giving that express intimation, we believe that we were following the guidance given, in particular, by Lord Edmund Davies in the Leveller case and the spirit of what was said by Lord Diplock in his opinion. In our view, there can be no misunderstanding of that intimation to the media.

   I stress that the consequences of any publication of the identity of a witness of the prohibited kind would have to be considered on its merits if and when it occurred. If that event were to happen, there would have to be a complaint about the matter and the Tribunal would have to consider it. I would have to decide whether in the circumstances it was appropriate to certify the matter in accordance with section 1(2) of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 to the High Court, and ultimately it would be a matter for the High Court to consider.

   It is for that reason that it would be inappropriate to call this explanation a ruling. But it is proper for me to say that, as a matter of law, I regard it as highly doubtful whether an editor could rely on the defence provided by section 4(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 if a publication that did seriously prejudice the course of justice in these proceedings were to be published now, despite the intimation given by this Tribunal, supported by senior counsel on all sides, who are fully acquainted with the nature of the evidence and the circumstances in which it has been obtained.

   Apart from the argument as to whether the particular publication did offend the strict liability rule defined in the Act of 1981, there would be the question whether the material was published in good faith. I will say only that it would surprise me if a court were to hold that publication in the face of an express warning was 'in good faith'. But that would be an issue to be decided upon the facts of the particular case rather than as a theoretical question.

   Finally, I should say that our intimation applies only to witnesses in the first stage of this Inquiry. The intimation is without time limit, subject to the provisions of the legislation, but it applies only to witnesses who are either complainants of abuse or the subject of allegations of abuse and witnesses who give evidence touching upon those allegations. Different considerations entirely will arise when we pass at a later stage to administrative matters relating to the children in care.

   We will keep under review the question of the application of the anonymity principle. We have already excepted persons whose names are already in the public domain, namely, those who have been convicted of offences forming part of our Inquiry and one of the complainants who is well known through the press as a potential witness in these proceedings[934]. But, if any particular question arises in relation to a specific witness, we will consider it and our Press Officer is always available to advise the press and the media if there is any matter left in doubt."

North Wales Tribunal of Inquiry

Important information for the Assistance of the Press and Media

  1      The Tribunal wishes to indicate that it will regard the following as prima facie evidence of a contempt of court:

   publication of any material in a written publication (as defined in section 6(1) of the 1992 Act) available to the public (whether on paper or in electronic form), or in a television or radio programme for reception in England and Wales, which is likely to identify any living person as a person by whom or against whom an allegation of physical or sexual abuse has been or is likely to be made in proceedings before the Tribunal, with the exception of those who have been convicted of criminal offences of physical or sexual abuse of children in care.

  2      The Tribunal considers that such publication is likely to create a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings of the Tribunal would be seriously prejudiced or impeded, not least because in the event of such publication, potential witnesses may be deterred from testifying, or from testifying fully, to the Tribunal. In the event of such publication, the Chairman would be minded, subject to any representations made to him at that time, to refer the matter to the Attorney General, and/or to the High Court, under the Contempt of Court Act 1981, and the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921.

  3      This is a general intimation. It is open to the Tribunal to give a different intimation in relation to any specific witness. The intimation will be subject to continuous review both during the proceedings of the Tribunal, and at the time of publication of the Tribunal's report.

Footnotes:

929   See Appendix 5 for the report by The Bridge on its work.

930   See Appendix 3 for the details of representation.

931   Hansard, 29 January 1990, Col 26.

932   Guidance on payment of legal costs to parties represented at public expense in public inquiries, June 1998.

933   See para 1.12 of the report.

934   This witness subsequently applied for and was granted anonymity.

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