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  1  I address below the principal issues which have arisen during the evidence concerning the response of the North Wales Police to complaints of abuse made by or on behalf of children in care between 1974 and 1996. The comments set out below are made solely from a policing perspective.

  2 The 1986/1987 investigation of DCS Gwynne Owen

2.1  There were a number of features of this investigation which were, in my experience, very unusual:

2.1.1  the decision to ask the head of the CID to conduct an enquiry personally.

2.1.2  the decision to undertake such extensive enquiries with a team of two, one of whom was head of the CID.

2.1.3  the fact that Mr Owen carried out the actual interviews of some witnesses and alleged offenders.

2.1.4  the decision not to involve the Director of Social Services in the investigation, together with the decision not to seize all available documentation, at the outset.

2.2  The concept of joint investigations was not a new one at that time and in not consulting the Director, DCS Owen denied himself access to the files and other documents held by the Department. He also denied the Department the opportunity of addressing the position of Mr Dodd. In my experience, the primary action necessary if collusion is feared, is the rapid seizure of evidence and the taking of important statements. Yet this did not happen in the 1986/1987 investigation: I can see no advantage, and significant disadvantage, in DCS Owen's method of proceeding.

2.3  Moreover, Mr Owen ought to have been aware from the outset that the evidence he was gathering would bring into question not only the criminal liability of Mr Dodd but also could raise questions as to his suitability for the post he held. I therefore find it inexplicable that there was such limited contact between him and Lucille Hughes [the Director of Social Services].

Thoroughness of the 1986 investigation

2.4  In carrying out his investigation, DCS Owen was under an obligation to do so with a high degree of thoroughness, particularly in the light of the fact that, as head of the CID, he had been selected to carry it out. Whether he discharged that obligation is essentially a matter for the Tribunal in the light of the evidence which it has heard, but in my view the following are some of the more important issues which require to be considered:

2.4.1  was any consideration given to the existence of documentary material in the possession of the Social Services Department, particularly at the commencement of the investigation, and, if not, why not?

2.4.2  was the allegation of assault by Nefyn Dodd upon (a boy at the tea-table)[960] properly investigated in the light of the number of potential witnesses to that event?

2.4.3  why did DCS Owen's team fail to find the 2 witnesses to (another) complaint[961] prior to submitting his 1986 report to the Chief Constable?

Urgency and thoroughness of the 1987 investigation

2.5  The 1987 enquiry commenced in December 1986 and was not completed until May 1988. In support of her statement (the former resident of Ty'r Felin)[962] offered the names of members of staff who would support her contentions. These witnesses were not all interviewed until the 21 March 1987. Bearing in mind the limited number of statements taken during the 1987 investigation, the overwhelming impression is of a sluggish and shallow investigation.

2.6  I would draw attention to the decision to delegate a number of the enquiries to surrounding police forces and in some cases to distant forces. These enquiries were conducted by junior officers who were briefed only by the covering letter. I am aware that to request a force to make enquiries on behalf of another was not unusual but I would suggest that in these circumstances it was unwise. The disadvantages of using officers from another force are obvious: they cannot have adequate local knowledge; they are unlikely to be sufficiently familiar with what other parties may have said, and may not be able to eliminate ambiguity and uncertainty; it may be seen by complainants as demonstrating a lack of commitment to them; and, in the particular circumstances of this investigation, there may be language difficulties. The cost involved in using North Wales Police officers would have been minimal.

The interviews with Nefyn Dodd: non-compliance with the provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

2.7  The requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which sets out the manner in which interviews will be conducted, were not complied with. No contemporaneous notes were taken. In my view, this is a startling omission, particularly in the light of the seniority of the investigating officer. Whether DCS Owen gave Mr Dodd "a hard time" during these interviews, or whether he simply permitted Dodd to dictate his own version of events, is a matter for the Tribunal to determine, but, if the latter, may reflect upon the question of the officer's commitment to the investigation.

The reports to the Director of Public Prosecutions

2.8  The police have always been encouraged to include in their reports their impressions of witnesses and any important or material issues bearing upon a prosecution which they feel will emerge should the matter go before a jury. However, in my experience, the comments made by Mr Owen in his report into the 1986 enquiry were thoroughly inappropriate and lacking in judgment. The fairness and objectivity called for in these circumstances was absent and his comments showed a lack of tolerance and understanding of the witnesses. Above all, very serious imputations appear to have been made about the character and motives of Alison Taylor and certain complainants[963] on the basis of little more than instinct.

Feedback to the Director of Social Services

2.9  It is my opinion that the meeting between DCS Owen and the Director of Social Services [Lucille Hughes] in the Imperial Hotel, Llandudno, was not only essential but should have been supported by an agreed minute or letter confirming the content of the meeting. Whether DCS Owen did express the view then or at any time that Nefyn Dodd was unsuited to his position is a matter of evidence for the Tribunal. Similarly, the 1987 investigation revealed a considerable amount of further evidence against Dodd, and should have resulted in a detailed briefing of Ms Hughes by DCS Owen.

  3  I should stress that in considering the adequacy of the 1986/1987 investigation, I have been mindful that practices have changed since the mid-eighties particularly in relation to allegations of child abuse, and have sought to put to one side the advantages of hindsight.

  4 The 1990 investigation

4.1  It is my opinion that the officer in charge of the enquiry Detective Chief Inspector Cronin took that enquiry as far as I would have expected at that time, and I would not criticise him for not going back to explore Norris's earlier time at Bryn Estyn.

4.1.1  the investigating team obtained a clear and coherent case from its interviews with past and present staff and residents of Cartrefle, sufficient to found a multi-count indictment alleging serious offences against Norris.

4.1.2  there were no complaints from or indicators towards Bryn Estyn, a home which had closed some 6 years earlier.

4.1.3  this was a "working together" investigation: DI Cronin gave evidence that he asked the Social Services Department for all relevant information about Norris, and was in regular contact with Geoffrey Wyatt. According to his evidence, there was no indication from the Department that Norris may have committed offences while at Bryn Estyn.

4.1.4  before any decision to extend the enquiry to Bryn Estyn was taken, consideration would be given to the cost and delay: the complainants in the Cartrefle prosecution were young and extremely vulnerable. In reality, if the investigation was to be extended to Bryn Estyn, the police would have had to carry out an investigation similar to that mounted in 1991/1992, ie would have sought to trace and interview all, or a large proportion, of former residents who passed through Cedar House and Clwyd House during Norris' time there.

  5 The 1991/1992 enquiry

5.1  This was a complex and widespread enquiry, carried out against a background of considerable interest by the media and local politicians. The linking of the lines of enquiry, the tracing of victims, and the arrest of suspects, were all conducted appropriately. Indeed, in the light of the scale and complexity of the investigation, I consider that it was conducted thoroughly and impressively. There are, nevertheless, a number of issues which were canvassed in evidence, upon which I would comment as follows.

  6 Adequacy of training of officers and briefing of those officers

Interviews of complainants by trained officers

6.1  It is clear from the evidence that the North Wales Police had a number of officers trained in interviewing possible victims of child abuse. The practices and procedures of interviewing vulnerable witnesses have improved dramatically over the past 20 years. Awareness of the difficulties in this form of enquiry had grown by 1992 and it is clear that the police were trying to ensure that the witnesses they were about to interview were properly cared for and considered. Training has improved further since 1992.

6.2  Taking into account the number of witnesses and severely traumatised witnesses the North Wales Police interviewed, and the comparatively small number of complaints of their treatment by the Police made by witnesses before the Tribunal, I do not consider that the force should be criticised for the manner of its treatment of witnesses generally. The Tribunal may find there to have been exceptions in individual cases, but, overall, the treatment of witnesses appears to have been satisfactory.

Proportion of female officers

6.3  According to the evidence, at the time of this enquiry the force had about 10 per cent female officers and a number of them were trained as interviewers of victims of abuse. There were five such officers in the enquiry team and the remainder had to remain on division to continue normal enquiries. I do not consider that unreasonable, and I would not criticise the breakdown of the teams by sex of the officers concerned.

Assistance from a psychologist

6.4  There may be a need, and perhaps this will be considered in another session in this Tribunal, for a national index to be maintained of suitably qualified instructors for this purpose who are available for such a task. The question of relevant experience and clearly defined purpose is important. It has been my experience that there are experts who offer their services during many types of police enquiries, but their value to the police investigation can be questionable.

Prior knowledge

6.5  I have experience of an enquiry in which prior knowledge of the witness by the police officer was used deliberately as a criterion for selecting the interviewing officer. Obviously, prior meetings which have been confrontational and negative are hardly likely to be conducive to a sensitive disclosure of abuse. This issue will always need to be addressed in each case by the senior investigating officer.

Statement-taking outside the North Wales Police's own geographical area

6.6  I commend the practice adopted of statement-taking by North Wales officers irrespective of the address of the witness. The commitment this shows, the local awareness and above all the avoidance of the witness being confronted by a total stranger from the area he has now chosen as a home, is in my view very important.

Arriving unannounced to see witnesses

6.7  This policy was explored in detail in evidence. In the circumstances of this enquiry, I personally would have chosen to arrive unannounced. The only additional comment I would make and a slight variation on the policy chosen by the North Wales Police, is that there must always be the case for an exception. Written advance notification is an alternative approach but the absence of available counselling, the difficulty in obtaining accurate addresses, and the possibility that others apart from the addressee may open or read the letter are but three of the problems which inevitably would have produced subsequent complaints if such methods had been adopted.

  7 Calling in an outside force

7.1  There were at various times calls for an outside force to be brought in to take over or supervise the major enquiry:

At the outset of the enquiry

7.2  When the 1991 enquiry was launched there was only one force to carry it out, and to have requested any other force to do so would have been unusual in the extreme. There were no grounds for employment of an outside force at that stage and it should not be forgotten that the then complainants, the Clwyd County Council referred the matter to the North Wales Police. The allegations of corruption in the CID and the suppression of evidence which were made at the very outset were explored by the police and were shown to be without foundation.

December 1991: the Independent on Sunday article

7.3  Although there were calls for an outside force following publication of the article, as at that time there had in fact been no allegations of sexual abuse by serving or former police officers, and it is impossible to see upon what rational basis the Chief Constable could have called in another force.

August 1992: allegations against Anglesea, X and Y[964]

7.4  Once police officers became involved in the allegations from August 1992 onwards the debate took a new twist. The reasons why it was not practicable to call in an outside force were rehearsed at length in evidence. Plainly, the Chief Constable had to exercise a discretion in the matter, and I would only criticise his decision if it could be shown to have been clearly wrong at the time. In reality, there were many factors supporting his decision. Above all, the major inquiry was very well advanced; the prime suspects had long since been arrested; the allegations against serving and former officers were closely linked to those against at least one of the suspects (Howarth); and a very large number of complainants had already been interviewed by the North Wales Police.

  8 Supervision by the Police Complaints Authority

8.1  The purpose of supervision by the PCA is to ensure that allegations against serving police officers are investigated thoroughly and impartially. In the event, supervision of the 1991/1992 inquiry was never a live possibility, as all of the serious allegations against serving and former police officers fell outside the purview of the PCA. X and Gordon Anglesea had already retired from the police at the time that allegations were made against them; Z[965] was a former special constable, to whom the statutory provisions governing the PCA did not apply; and although Y was a serving officer, the allegations against him pre-dated those statutory provisions.

  9 A review

9.1  A review of the enquiry as it was being conducted may have been one option to answer the perceived need in some quarters to question the independence of the North Wales Police, but such a review would have been an entirely new phenomenum. In 1991/1992 such reviews were confined to reviews of eg a murder enquiry in which no arrest had been made in the first 28 days or so in order that the investigating officer had the benefit of a second opinion to confirm that he had forgotten or omitted nothing. They were not intended as a means of reassuring the public or sections of it that an enquiry was being conducted thoroughly and impartially.

 Sir Ronald Hadfield

Footnotes:

960   See para 33.76 of the report.

961   See paras 51.08 and 51.18 of the report.

962   See para 51.19 of the report.

963   See para 51.13 of the report.

964   See paras 51.66 and 51.67 of the report.

965   See para 51.68 of the report.